The Quiet Title Act (28 U.S.C. 2409-a) has—incorrectly—been described as “adverse possession against the U.S. Government.” While the act does describe a 12-year limitation on certain claims against the Federal Government, it should not be conflated with prescriptive rights. Enacted in 1972, this law embodies a limited ‘waiver’ of federal immunity against private claims and allows some claims between conflicting private and public rights to proceed. In recent years, it also has been a factor in numerous disputes over purported public ways across federal lands.
Paragraph (g) states: “Any civil action under this section, except for an action brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States.”
Two phrases in the preceding paragraph have caused numerous headaches for the courts.
One problematic phrase is “…knew or should have known…” Several recent court decisions make clear that landowners exercising easement rights over government land are not put on notice by government actions or statements that do not interrupt the apparent right. This distinction has been highlighted in disputes concerning easements over military bases.
Werner v. United States: 9 F.3d 1514 (1993) describes a dispute on Eglin Air Force Base over a road serving two private subdivisions and a recreation area in Florida. Government representatives argued that the knowledge that the government owned the land was sufficient to provide notice of a potential taking to private parties using a road. However, the road had been used by numerous parties for years without interruption.
Overturning a lower court ruling, this court concludes: “…the triggering event for statute of limitations purposes was not the time at which the claimants knew that the government was owner but the time at which they knew or should have known that the government claimed that it could deny use by the plaintiffs of the access road to their property because there was no easement (or only a limited easement) permitting such use.”
The second source of potential confusion in paragraph (g) is the phrase “…shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years…” Despite its similarity to language found in many state statutes relating to prescriptive claims, courts have affirmed that the Quiet Title Act does not operate to transfer title. Furthermore, paragraph (n) states: “…Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the United States based upon adverse possession. …”
In Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of University & School Lands: 461 U.S. 273 (1983), the court observes: “Section 2409a(f), however, does not purport to strip any State, or anyone else for that matter, of any property rights. The statute limits the time in which a quiet title suit against the United States can be filed; but, unlike an adverse possession provision, §2409a(f) does not purport to effectuate a transfer of title. If a claimant has title to a disputed tract of land, he retains title even if his suit to quiet his title is deemed time-barred under § 2409a(f). A dismissal pursuant to §2409a(f) does not quiet title to the property in the United States. The title dispute remains unresolved. Note that language described in this ruling as paragraph (f) is currently found in paragraph (g) due to a 1986 revision of the Quiet Title Act.
The Quiet Title Act is not applicable unless the United States Government is party to the dispute. The Pennsylvania court noted this rule in Zerr v. Commonwealth: 570 A.2d 132 (1990). At first glance, this seemed to be an internal state dispute. The land in question (formerly federal land) was recognized as a state park owned by the state of Pennsylvania, but the U.S. Government retained limited mineral rights beneath the surface. Furthermore, language in relevant documents mandated that the tract would revert to the U.S. Government if it ceased to be used as a park. This dispute originally was brought before the Pennsylvania court, but the presiding judge quickly concluded that the problem would have to be transferred to the federal court system because the United States was an indispensable party.
Quiet Title Act & R.S. 2477 Roads
Many roads in the western states are referred to as “R.S. 2477 Roads,” due to their origins under Revised Statute 2477(enacted 1866.) Southwest Four Wheel Drive Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Management: 271 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (2003) notes that the statute was repealed in 1976, yet roads that legitimately were established under the statute were not terminated: “R.S. 2477 was repealed 110 years later by the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), § 706(a), Pub.L.No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2793. All accepted rights-of-way existing at the time of R.S. 2477’s repeal in 1976, however, remain valid. Consequently, 25 years after the repeal of R.S. 2477, issues regarding the existence and scope of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way continue to be litigated.” The practical effect of R.S. 2477 was to legitimize roads—established by long public use—across federal lands that normally would be immune to anything resembling prescriptive claims by private parties or the public. This statute is only applicable to roads over federal lands and has no application to any claims made on state or privately held properties.
Several circumstances have reinforced the continued relevance of this law in the United States. Some R.S. 2477 roads originally were established on federal property that was later conveyed to a state or to private individuals. These roads may still be enforceable, provided the land grants occurred after all requirements were met. Numerous recent disputes also have dealt with roads over lands later dedicated as National Parks. Proper resolution of these cases requires significant research into historic usage of remote roads during a period of time when roads generally were disregarded.
The intersection of R.S. 2477 and the Quiet Title Act have triggered complex arguments over the intervals when claims of these roads may be pursued against the United States Government.
Unfortunately for private landowners in these disputes, an R.S. 2477 claim of a private easement across federal land typically will fail. As noted in United States v. Wells: 873 F.3d 1241 (2017): “In this regard, we have repeatedly held, in the context of civil actions to establish R.S. 2477 right-of-ways, that the Quiet Title Act (“QTA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, is the “exclusive means by which adverse claimants [can] challenge the United States’ title to real property.” … Importantly, we also have ruled that individual members of the public do not have a cognizable claim to public roads; more specifically, they cannot satisfy the QTA requirement to “set forth with particularity the nature of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff claims in the real property.””
Does every gate interrupt the right? Not always...
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